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Abstract 
 
This study examines the relationship between ownership and financial performance of domestic 
and foreign banks of Pakistan during 2001-2010. The ownership is divided into domestic banks 
and foreign banks. To measure the financial performance, we used return of assets, return on 
equity and dividend payout ratios. The study has used the secondary data,obtained from Stock 
market and annual financial reports of Pakistan. By applying the panel data, we have found 
significant relationships of domestic banks with the financial performance of the banks. Our 
results show domestic banks performed better as compared to foreign banks in Pakistan.  
Key Words: Performance, Ownership, Domestic Banks, Foreign Banks, Pakistan.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1Background  
 
The growth of the banking sector is considered as an important factor in the development of the 
economic growth of the country. The key policies towards micro and macro level stability, as 
well as, instability concerned with the efficient banking system of the respective country. The 
soundness of the banking system is most important in the growth framework particularly for 
developing countries since the banking sector has great influence on the growth in the early 
stages and also for the better financial market . 
 
The reformation of the banking sector initiated in the decade of 1990s, when the government of 
Pakistan allowed a multitude of foreign banks to venture and locate their businesses in the realm 
of the Pakistan banking sector. It is found from several sources that that foreign banks' entry 
have borne quite healthy and positive influence in the efficiency and working  of the domestic 
banking sector of Pakistan ( Atsushi Iimi, 2004). 
 
 
Demirug-count and Huizinga (2001) has done their investigation in developing and developed 
countries for comparison of performance in foreign and domestic banks during the years 1988-
1995. Their results showed the positive impact on profit and reducing the overhead expenses.  
 
However, unfortunately, not so much research has done in developing countries in this regard, 
but the effect of financial reforms has been examined in various capacities in the developing 
world‟s financial sector. This research on the financial reform provides an empirical proof of 
insight findings on government policies, regulatory authorities regarding the efficiency of the 
banking sector indirectly (Berger and Humphrey 1997). The financial reforms started in 
developing countries during the early 1980 have its desirable impacts on reforms regarding the 
efficiency and performance of the banking sector was examined recently. 
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1.2 History of Pakistan banking system 
 
The banking system in Pakistan has been under the transformative phase for the last fifteen years 
via the instruments of deregulations and privatization of multiple banks being privatized which 
were once under the title of Government. It is also important to note that all domestic banks were 
once nationalized in the era of the 1970s when former Prime Minister Bhutto initiated the Step of 
nationalization of private assets under the banner of Socialism. This nationalization of banks 
resulted in overstaffing, an unnecessary expansion of branching and politicization of recruitment 
policies, which led towards the week portfolio. The political instability and disorder in regulatory 
policies resulted into under-efficient performance of the banking sector for these reasons. For 
this reason the Government of Pakistan overwhelmingly decided to take the financial system 
reforms with the assistance of international monetary fund, the World Bank and other donor 
agencies as the result of structural adjustment programs.  
However it is to be noticed that the major reason of the reforming the financial system in the 
decade of 1990s was to adopt a market-based monitoring system of portfolio management, which 
creates a complete milieu in the banking sector. Through market-based monitoring system, there 
can be judgment of demand and supply of services churned out of the banking sector, which is 
quite difficult in the nationalized banking sector.    
The banking sector of Pakistan went through various phases of reform in accordance with the 
needs of the time. The initial and first phase of reforms was started in the late 1980s. In the initial 
stage, there occurred a policy of softening the liberalization regime for state-owned banks. Many 
banks like nationalized banks were partially privatized by the Government such as the ABL 
(Allied Bank Limited) and MCB (Muslim Commercial Bank). But another remarkable feature of 
this whole process was to grant the full autonomy to State Bank of Pakistan, national regulatory 
bank of Pakistan. Prior to its autonomy it was also under constraints to function under the 
ministry of finance. Later on it became independent of all shackles. It is pertinent to note here 
that during this tenure of liberalization policy initiation, all these steps were taken by the 
government to solely focus on enhancing the efficiency in the banking sector of Pakistan to 
ensure the competition base market system. An environment ridden with competition always 
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brings within it efficient methods of operations to maximize profits in private hands. The state is 
less concerned with profit and more with power. It resulted into inefficiency of the financial 
sector as this section will be perused in the literature review. Its priorities are based on power-
structure not on market-oriented stages of economic growth. In this regard, some of the 
considerable effort had been taken such as an increase in asset quality, improve the managerial 
structure, reducing control on credits and leading the market environment (Ramiz ur Rehman and 
awais Roaf, 2010). 
In the second stage of reforming the banking sector in 1990s, the major aim was to totally 
finalize the privatization and liberalization policy. In this phase: 
 Firstly, the capital structure of the banks was modified.  
 Secondly, partially privatized banks were fully privatized.  
 Thirdly, the ownership of the State Bank of Pakistan was decreased by 93% to 34% 
(SBP). 
In the second phase of reformation, following are the beneficial outcomes in the banking sector 
of Pakistan:  
 Ten new private banks were given licenses to enter into the market in 1991.  
 The residual share value was covered by 25 foreign banks including the some of 
international banks.  
 Banks were given detailed instruction regarding the credit policy for specific sectors, 
expansion of the branches and also the given administration of interest rates.  
 At the end of 2010, the number of  banks were 46, which includes 33 private banks and 
13 as foreign bank (SBP). 
 
The net-effect of all of this reformative phases of the financial sector came in early 2000 and 
within the short span of 5 years in the banking industry in Pakistan was of worth 4 trillion rupees 
in 2005. The total share of the banking sector assets to GDP ratio increased from 47.2% to 55.6% 
during 2000 to 2005. These facts show the tectonic, but hopeful changes in Pakistan GDP with 
compare to later years of 1990. All these achievements were due to the liberalization, 
privatization and transformation of banking sectors from public to private sector. Another 
interesting factor was the return on the banking asset which was uplifted up to 2.6% and return 
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on equity was in 25.4%. According to the World Bank, Pakistani banking sector has been ranked 
second amongst the South Asian countries. The profitability and the capital structure were 
improved and it reached at exorbitant levels of 11.91%. Inefficient loan was reduced 
significantly to 2.1% which was almost close to international standards. The payback ratio of 
loan is now at 70% (Ramiz ur Rehman and awais Roaf, 2010). 
Current statistical facts about Pakistan Banking Sector 
 
Figure 1: components of balance sheet (source: SBP) 
 
Figure 2: Share of Deposits 
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Figure 3: Major Components 
The above figures 1,2 and 3 show that total asset of this sector was growing from RS 7.2 trillion 
in year 2010 to 8.3 trillion in year 2011, showing an increase of 15.4%. Similarly the equity of 
the banking sector increased 28 % in year 2011 as compared to the year 2010. The growth in 
total equity of the foreign banks  was also positive and increase of 23 % over the previous year. 
Total deposit rose up to RS 6.3 trillion in year 2011, showing an increase of 14.6% and it 
compose 15% share of total liabilities. 
1.3Significance of the study 
 
Significance of study is an important part of the research as it exhibits that how much study is 
relevant to the current  time of any modern trend prevailing that time. Therefore this study was 
taken to underline the changing banking structure of Pakistan as this area of research has not 
been touched in depth. The banking sector in Pakistan has gone through the dramatic phases, 
which include:  
 Changing the ownership structure  
 Regulatory authorities  
 Supervision under the State Bank of Pakistan 
 
After the nationalization of the banking sector during the 1970s, the structure of the banking was 
regulated by the government and it was considered as the most regulated sectors of the country's 
economy. This nationalization of the banking sector resulted in the poor performance and 
inadequate efficiency of the banking sector adversely affecting the economy of Pakistan during 
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that period. After this, adverse effect was discovered, it was decided to liberalize and deregulate 
the banking sector allowing the some of the banks to privatize. The five major banks were 
privatized during the 1980 and then  the Government kept this process intact through the 
instruments of liberalizing financial policies and allowing the foreign banks to enter into the 
Pakistan market in 1990s. 
All these dramatic changes have an impact on the Pakistan banking sector on their performance 
and productivity level. These reforms have provided an opportunity to analyze the performance 
and efficiency of Pakistan banks in some different dimension. For this we have to understand the 
historical background of the Pakistan banking system. 
1.4 Objective of the study 
 
The objective of the study is important to peruse that how the study will be beneficial to 
researchers, academicians and businessmen. The second objective of the study can be found in 
the extension of current knowledge available. The third objective of study is open to new vistas 
of research in the current study. The objectives of the current study are briefly discussed in the 
following lines.   
The main objective of this study is to answer the main research question that the ownership 
structure of banks operating in Pakistan has an impact on bank performance or not. To answer 
the question knowledge about the Pakistan banking industry has extended to determine the 
financial performance indicator on the basis of financial ratios by analyzing the ownership of 
banks in different terms. From the previous literature,   performance  and efficiency of the 
banking industry has been determined on the basis of ownership, the size of banks, different 
financial ratios and etc. 
1.5 Contribution of this study 
 
This study will contribute to adding new knowledge on the basis of ownership and  financial 
performance in one of the developing country i.e. Pakistan. This study will go one step further to 
previous literature about dividend payout.  We will examine which bank pays more dividend. 
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The research design will include a study of Commercial banks with varying ownership. The 
results of this study will be of particular interest not only to Pakistanis regulators, professional 
bodies and boards of directors but also to international agencies such as the World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund and Asian Development Bank operating throughout  East Asia and 
beyond.  
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1.6 Problem statement 
 
In all over the world banking performance has been evaluated at different times for the study of 
the impact of different variables on bank performance. Most of the studies have been conducted 
in developed countries. But in developing countries this era has been neglected. This creates a 
huge space for the research in banking sector of developing and underdeveloped economies. The 
results vary from different points of view even for the same variables as well. For example 
Denizer (1970) found the result in Australia as the public banks are more dominant in new 
environment while the SUBRATA SARKAR et al (2003) also found the same result in India as 
the banks with public ownership are more dominant. Also Berger and Mester  (2007), and 
Humphrey and Pulley (1997) describe the example of US experience with banks financial 
reforms and by Lozano-Vivas (1998) for Spanish banks and few studies are available to show the 
effect of financial reforms in Developing countries like (Gilbert and Wilson, 1998, and Leightner 
and Lovell, (1998) suggest that financial sector reforms does enhance financial sector efficiency, 
although in many instances profit (and revenue) performance improves more than cost 
efficiency. Similarly, the Berger et al (2007), found that public banks are less efficient, but in 
contrast to his previous research , investigated about the least GDP share for those developing 
countries‟ where the largest share of banks is state owned. 
 
I have constructed the problem statement for my research study by critically examine the result 
contradictions in developed and developing countries. As mentioned above that Pakistan banking 
industry has also gone through in financial reforms during the different time span. Most of the 
literature in current time also discuss the banks' performance after the reforms in the financial 
sector and then bring out their investigation.  
So keeping in view the importance of financial ratios to study the bank performance and 
ownership structure I have developed my research problem based on available literature: 
 Does the ownership impacts on financial performance of the domestic and foreign banks 
in Pakistan? 
 How the financial ratios will determine the performance of the banks under domestic 
ownership? 
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 How the financial ratios will determine the performance of the banks under foreign 
ownership?  
1.7 Layout of this study 
 
This thesis has been divided into seven major chapters as shown in figure 1, i.e. Introduction, 
review of literature, theoretical and conceptual framework, Research methodology, result and 
analysis, Discussion and Conclusions and recommendations. 
The first chapter of the thesis has provided an introduction regarding the topic of the thesis and 
has given a bird‟s eye view of the thesis. This chapter has discussed the aims and objectives of 
the research, followed by the research questions, rationale for conducting the research, the 
significance and contribution of the thesis. 
The second chapter discusses the literature regarding the topic. In the second chapter, this thesis 
had conducted a thorough and critical investigation of relevant sources, outlined, compared, and 
discussed major ideas, explanations and concepts.  
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Figure 4 OUTLAY OF THE STUDY 
 
 
The third chapter of this thesis has laid the theoretical foundation of the research by discussing 
the concept of agency cost, ownership theory and resource depenendent theory and finally built a 
conceptual framework for this study. 
 
The fourth chapter has discussed the methodology that has applied for the research purpose in 
this thesis. The fifth chapter is the result and analysis of the  findings that this thesis had made 
through research. In this chapter, this thesis has discussed and analyzed the results of the thesis, 
answered the research questions, and met all the research aims and objectives.  
 
Finally, the sixth chapter consists of conclusions, recommendations and limitation of the study. 
In the sixth chapter, this thesis has summarized the whole thesis. 
  
1 
• Introduction to the topic and discussion of aims, objectives, rationality and 
contribution of the study 
2 
•A critical review of relevant literature 
3 
•A  development of theoritical background and Conceptual framework 
4 
•A compact description of the methodology, which has been applied for 
research 
5 
 
• Description of results, followed by analysis of the results. Answers to research 
questions  
 
6 
• Discussion and Conclusion 
•Limiations and assumptions of the study. 
•Recommedations for future course of study 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
The literature which is concerned to examine the relationship between bank ownership and 
performance or bank ownership and efficiency are mixed. We are going to discuss these results 
in detail in our literature review part.  Brissimis and Delis (2006) observed that both exterior and 
domestic factors have their effects on the framework and performance of banking sector all over 
the world.  
 
Cornett et al ( 2009) exhibits that how government ownership and government participation in a 
country‟s economic system affect the performance of banking sector from 1989 through 2004. 
The findings of the study also show that state-owned economic and banking institutions operated 
less profitably when compared with privately owned state institutions. It is because that these 
institutions held less primary investment, and had higher credit risk than privately-owned 
economic institutions before 2001, and the performance variations were more significant in those 
nations where higher government participation and political corruption joined hands in the 
economical system of the respective states.  
 
In addition, from 1997 to 2000, the 4-year interval after the initiation of the economic problems 
of East Asian economies, the deterioration in the income profits, primary investment, and credit 
quality of state-owned institutions was significantly higher than that of privately-owned 
institutions, especially for the nations that were hardest hit by the East Asian economic and 
financial constraints. However, state-owned economical institutions closed the gap with 
privately-owned economical institutions on income profits, primary investment, and 
nonperforming loans in the post-crisis interval of 2001–2004. 
 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) studied the performance of domestic and foreign banks in 
eighty countries including developing and developed countries from 1988-1995. They examined 
that how the net profit margin, overhead expenses, taxes paid and profitability differ between 
domestic and foreign banks and found that foreign banks perform better in term of profitability 
in developing countries, but it‟s totally the opposite in developed countries. 
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Evans and Molyneux (2001) focus on the German banking market during 1989-1996 to 
differentiate between private commercial banks, public savings and mutual cooperative banks 
and found that private commercial banks are inefficient in terms of profit with compare to cost. 
Several studies have discussed the concept of performance with the profitability on a particular 
country like (Berger, 1995; Guru et al., 2002; Barajas et al., 2001; Ben Naceur and Goaied, 
2001). Berger (1995) examines the return on equity and the capital asset ratio for the sample 
banks of US banks during 1983_1992 by using the Granger model and found that both ratios has 
a positive impact on performance. 
Guru et al. (2002) investigate the performance of seventeen Malaysian commercial banks during 
1986-1999 to determine the profitability performance of these banks. The profitability were divided 
into two main categories, namely the internal determinants (liquidity, capital adequacy and expense 
management) and the external determinants (ownership, firm size and external Economic 
conditions). They found that the bank has the low profit performance of banks to other determinants. 
Taboada (2011) analyses that a new trend of financial institution privatizations in the past several 
years has considerably modified the possession structure of financial systems around the world. 
His study examines in depth that how the changes in the structure of the banking sector have an 
impact the allowance of capital within nations. Enhances in nation-based block holder possession 
of financial institutions negatively impact the allocation of investment through improved loaning 
action to less effective sectors and to those with less dependence on exterior finance. This result 
is more noticeable in nations with higher levels of data file crime error. I find some proof that 
international existence improves investment allowance performance by improving lending to 
more effective sectors, mainly in common law countries.  
Lin and Zhang (2009) observed that the financial system in Chinese suppliers is the biggest and 
most complicated among the nations currently in conversion from main planning to market-
based financial systems. In the last two years, Chinese supplier's government-owned financial 
institutions have gone through an amazing privatization program that, distinct from the 
experience of other conversion nations, has followed a step-by-step strategy to change. The 
producing changes in the possession of Chinese institutions of finance increase important 
concerns in this regard. In particular, what part national personal possession and international 
personal possession play in banks‟ performance compared to condition ownership?  
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To address these concerns, the authors implement an econometric technique that creates on the 
literary works on the performance effects of various types of bank possession in creating nations 
and apply it to a unique data set on Chinese supplier‟s financial institutions from 1997 to 2004. 
Outcomes indicate that four big state-owned professional financial institutions are less 
successful, are less effective, and have more intense resource quality than city-level professional 
financial institutions, household joint-equity financial institutions, recently established Chinese-
foreign joint-equity financial institutions, and financial institutions capitalized entirely by 
international resources (static effect).  
 
It also finds that financial institutions going through an international purchase or public record 
better pre-event performance than those that do not (selection effect). These outcomes 
recommend that international traders may choose to obtain the best performing banks, or on the 
other hand that the government offers the value of better doing financial institutions first in an 
effort to entice international and many. 
 
Molyneux and Thornton (1992) explore the determinants of bank's profitability on 18 European 
countries during the 1986-1989 periods. They find positive impact on ROA and the level of interest 
rates in each country with government ownership. 
 
Xiaochi Lin (2009) investigates the effect of bank ownership on performance for 60 banks. They 
used the Return on equity, Return on asset, Impaired (non-performing) assets to total loans, 
Costs to operating income to measure the performance of all the banks.  
 
Muhammet Mercan et al (2003) investigated the financial performance index of Turkish 
commercial banks during 1989-1999. This index allowed them to investigate the effects of scale 
and mode of ownership of banks with the financial performance of banks. They used the DEA 
model by assuming the constant return of the scales. Financial ratios were used for input and 
output and showing the yearly based result which determined private and foreign owned Turkish 
commercial banks performed better than government owned banks. 
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Marcia Millon Cornett et al (2010) examines the effect of government ownership in the banking 
system during the Asian crisis. They include 16 countries from Asia to see the effect of the Asian 
crisis on the bank's performance during 1989 to 2004.the period from 1997 to 2000 shows the 
crisis effects on all the banks. The gathered the data from different sources to establish the 
ownership percentage of the banks. By using the capital/assets, Allowance for loan, 
Nonperforming loans/loans, Loans/deposits, Government securities/assets, Asset growth rate  as 
dependent variables by using the regression finds out that state owned banks generally operated 
less profitable and have lower ability to take credit risks than privately owned banks prior to 
2001. 
The Banking sector in most of the transition countries consists of different segments with 
different functions and speared with an extensive branch network. Their primary function is to 
collect the deposit,  handles the transactions including  foreign currency matters. Domestic 
commercial banks were handled by state banks in many countries. 
There are several studies discussing the concept of efficiency and ownership in the banking 
sector which also relevant to the performance of banks as well ( Lin and Zhang , 2009).   
Literature is more focused on developing countries but growing literature is available from 
developing countries particularly from Asia.  In this section  I will try to summarize the relevant 
literature related to efficiency and ownership.  Different researches have discussed the concept of 
efficiency in different dimension with the ownership for example Berger et al (2007) measure the 
cost of efficiency and income efficiency in U.S banking also Ali et al (2004) determines the 
efficiency of Pakistan and Indian banking by comparing the resource utilization of credits and 
income generation of all commercial banks with the help of the DEA. 
 
As we have already discussed Pakistan banking system has gone through in different reforms, 
including the liberalization and deregulation. The results of these studies are mixed. The 
objective of the deregulation is to increase the efficiency in the financial system. The result of 
deregulation in US banking shows the cost of efficiency decline. 
Isik and Hasan (2003) also investigate by using the total factor productivity index and conclude 
financial reforms have a positive impact on Turkish commercial banks during 1980-1990. Other 
studies conducted by Ozkan Gurney et al (2006) to compare the Turkish banking industry before 
and after the crisis by using the DEA. They took the date from private and foreign banks for ten 
23 
 
23 
 
years during 1990-2000 and computed the efficiency by using the two models. The results 
reported that 25% of the domestic commercial banks were taken by saving  banks and the overall 
efficiency score decline in this span due to stroke weeks in the pre crisis era. 
 
Avkiran (2000) and Sturm and Williams (2004) investigate about the productivity of ten banks of 
Australia during 1986-1995 after the financial reforms concluding the increase in productivity of 
banks. Kirkwood et al (2003) compared the cost and profit efficiency for 10 Australian banks 
during (1995-2002) by using the DAE approach in estimating the efficiency scores of two 
comparing the two models. In model  A, labor and net fixed assets as inputs and interest bearing 
assets and Non interest bearing assets as outputs. In model B, they used the same inputs as in 
model A, with different outputs as profit before tax and abnormal items. For both models applied 
Malmquist Productivity indices to separate the technological changes on profit efficiency. After 
combining the result it was concluded revenue efficiency was increased in major banks while the 
regional banks show the negative results. However, major banks show the same result towards 
profit and cost efficiency and the regional banks shows the reverse results. 
 
Sathye (2001) also used the DEA to measure the efficiency score of 29  commercial banks of 
Australia in 1996.To estimate the efficiency score by taking labor, physical capital and loan able 
funds as inputs while loan and demand deposit as outputs and also address the issue of ownership 
by separating the sample in term of the ownership. The estimated result of the Australian banks 
was 0.58 which was lower as compare to world efficiency score. However, the results showed 
that domestic banks performed well as compared to foreign counterpartners. 
 
Some pioneer studies have been conducted in Eurpean context where Tulkens (1993) to compare 
the efficiency of two large bank branches in Belgium where one bank is publicly owned and the 
other one is privately owned by using the non-parametric techniques. This work compares the 
results between two bank branches and derived the conclusion the public bank branches are more 
efficient than the private bank branches. 
24 
 
24 
 
 
2.1 Literature From Pakistan 
 
An increasing trend has been shown in studies regarding the concept of efficiency in Pakistan 
banking industry. Researchers have done their research in order to know the efficiency of banks 
under different dimensions. For example, Akhtar (2002) used Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) and took the sample of 40 banks in 1998. Deposits and capital of the banks were used as 
input and investment portfolios and loans advancements were considered as output. The result 
showed that the overall efficiency of  Pakistan banks was .80 which was lower than the world 
average banking efficiency score .86 by Burger and Humphery (1997). 
 
Rizvi (2001) conducted a study during 1993-98 to measure the productivity of Pakistan banks by 
applying the DEA. A sample of 36 banks including domestic, foreign and public banks was used 
during the first financial reforms in Pakistan banking industry to see the effects of reforms. The 
result showed that domestic banks performed better than a foreign bank in this duration. 
 
Qayyum et al (2006) conducted his study by taking the sample of 29 including the domestic, 
foreign and public banks during 1998-05. They used Stochastic Frontier Analysis by using input 
as labor, capital and borrowed funds while taking two outputs, loan advances and investments. 
The results showed that the efficiency score was highest in 2004 for all types of banks while it 
was lowest in 2001 for all groups. The result showed that domestic banks were less efficient than 
foreign banks. The scale of economies also exists in this study for all banks which shows the 
scale of economies was higher for small banks and lower for big banks. A domestic bank has a 
lower economy of scales as compare to foreign banks. 
 
Usman et al (2009) conducted a study for 20 domestic commercial banks of Pakistan and used 
the data since 1990-2005. For measuring the efficiency of banks they also used DEA and 
Malmquist Productivity Index of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) for the purpose of the change 
in date over the time. They divided the data in three stages of time period i.e. pre-reform period 
(1991-1997), first reform period (1998-2001) and second reform period (2002-2005). For the 
estimation purpose they also used deposits, labor and capital as inputs and loan advances and 
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Investment as outputs. Overall result showed that efficiency of the banks increase after the 
financial reforms. 
 
Akmal et al (2008) estimated the technical efficiency of the Pakistan banking sector by taking 
the sample of 30 banks including 4 public, 18 private and 8 foreign banks during the period of 
1996-2005. For estimation purposes they used the two stage DEA to calculate the score for 
technical and scale efficiency and also used the Tobin regression to find out the effect of several 
banks on macroeconomic factors. The results suggested that banking efficiency has increased 
since 2000 and foreign banks are more efficient than private and public banks in Pakistan. 
 
Niazi et al (2006) also investigated the impact of financial reforms on Pakistan banking industry 
during 1993-96. For estimating the efficiency score, they also used DAE approach for 30 
samples of banks including the public, private and foreign banks. They find that foreign banks 
have better performance than other banks and also confirm the negative relationship between the 
size of the banks and its efficiency score. 
 
Hassan Mobeen Alam et al (2011) investigated the performance of public and private banks in 
Pakistan by using the profitability, efficiency, liquidity and capital ratio during 2006-2009. They 
found that the  public bank performs better for the return on assets and equity while private 
banks perform better in Non-Interest Expenses to Total Income and for net interest margin ratios. 
For liquidity ratios, public banks are better on the base of cash & cash equivalents to total assets 
ratio of banking and investments to total assets ratio. 
2.2 Rationality of Research 
 
The above literature exhibits that whenever the privatization of the banking sector occurs 
anywhere in the world, the performance and productivity of banking sector improve very well. 
Numerous studies have been conducted in the past in different parts of the world from which 
different inferences have been concluded by the researchers. However, the research on this topic 
in Pakistan has been well-night absent. Some of the studies also present the result from Pakistan 
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but these studies do not the fill the gap during 2001-2010. This creates the gap for researchers, 
students and business entities as well. Therefore, I have undertaken research to peruse this sector. 
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework 
 
For this study we will use the agency theory, the theory of ownership and resource dependent 
theory for  describing the impact of ownership in different dimensions and resource dependent 
theory. 
3.1 Agency Theory 
 
Agency theory traditionally assumes that the objectives of the shareholders and management are 
inherently incompatible (Berle and Means 1932). Corporate governance mechanisms have to be 
designed to reduce this divergence in objectives. Lear (1997) defines corporate governance as 
"the whole process of running a company and serving the best interests of the shareholders in 
conformity with the laws and ethics of the land. All of the factors that are involved in balancing 
the power between the CEO, the board and the shareholders are now considered to be a part of 
the corporate governance syndrome”. Corporate governance mechanisms thus refer to the set of 
internal and external agency cost-reducing arrangements (Agrawal and Knoeber 1996). 
 
Prowse (1995) advances the view that concentrated shareholding is probably the most commonly 
found mechanism that alleviates agency problems efficiently even for corporations operating in a 
weak minority protection regulatory regime. In their study of 114 U.S  publicly held corporations 
over 1974-84 periods. Holderness and Sheehan (1998) find that the identity of the seller or buyer 
as an individual or corporation does not influence the share price, when a shareholder owns at 
least 50 percent share capital. They suggest that majority shareholders in the U.S., where 
minority rights are well enforced legally, do not expropriate minority shareholders. Denis and  
Denis (1994)  also finds that ownership concentration of both majority-owned and non-majority-
owned control corporations are positively related to the family involvement in the management 
of their sample of 72 U.S. corporations in 1985, in which the insider controls at least half of the 
voting shares. They argue further that a family‟s or insider‟s effective monitoring eliminates the 
problem of management‟s opportunism. 
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 McConaughy et al. (1998) also find that U.S. founding family-controlled corporations 
outperform its non-founding family-controlled corporations in terms of relative efficiency and 
corporate value after examining their accounting ratios, sales growth, market-to-book equity 
ratios and market returns. In contrast, recent research especially outside the U.S. such as those of 
Faccio and Lang (2002) and Faccio et. al. (2001) does not support the view that family 
shareholders are not corporate value enhancers because the cost of expropriation may exceed 
benefits accruing to their contributions. Surveying the U.S. literature that examines the effect of 
insider and shareholder share ownership of the value of corporations, Holderness (2003) 
concludes that the body of evidence indicates that even this relationship is mixed and never very 
pronounced positively or negatively.  
 
U.S. research also identifies ownership by large institutional investors as another potential 
mechanism in reducing agency costs. By actively monitoring management, large institutional 
investors mitigate potential agency problems. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Brickley and 
James (1987) explain that it is more economically efficient for the large institutional investors in 
which they have significant shareholdings to be actively monitoring management to enhance the 
value of the corporation such as preventing management entrenchment in takeover situations. 
First, shareholders can coordinate their concerted effort in effectively reducing information 
asymmetries by demanding from management access to information on their financial 
performance. Second, shareholders with substantial control can remove managers who fail to 
discharge their duties or facilitate a takeover by selling their shares to stronger parties who can 
better discipline management. Bathala and Rao (1995) contend that institutional investors are 
more likely to go for the less costly option of adding their own directors to the Board to ensure 
managerial accountability.  
 
Based on a sample of companies in the Czech Republic, Claessens et al. (1999) also provides 
support that the presence of the government shareholders who behave more like institutional 
investors improves the share value of the corporations. In contrast, Xu and Wang (1997) find that 
the profitability of listed corporations in China decreases with higher government shareholding 
as the government‟s objective is to preserve its control and not long term growth. Hence, 
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Claessens et al (1999) argues that a second influential shareholder is desirable so as to prevent 
undue dominance of a single shareholder over the board. 
 
Fama and Jensen (1983) hold that the board is the first line of defense against agency problems 
because it is vested with power to accept or reject strategic decisions and to hire, fire and reward 
top management. Initial empirical research assumes that boards with characteristics such as 
having more outside directors or dual leadership (where the roles of the chairman and chief 
executive officer are separated) are more interested in monitoring management and reduce 
agency costs.  
 
Recent research has since refocused on the contingency approach. This approach is based on the 
premise that the board structures itself to achieve the required degree of independence to control 
agency problems created by its own unique ownership (Redibar and Seth 1995). Fama and 
Jensen (1983), and Jensen (1993) have identified board composition, board leadership structure 
and board size as the three main determinants of board effectiveness constituting corporate 
governance. 
 
In its capacity as another external control mechanism, the market for corporate control acts as the 
discipline of last resort (Fama 1980). Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that top management whose 
self-interested acts diminish corporate value is subject to being replaced by other competing 
management teams who offer their services as alternatives. Brickley and James (1987) identify 
takeovers as the substitute mechanisms for monitoring managerial behavior. This external 
control can be activated following the failure of internal control mechanisms (Walsh and Seward 
1990). Similarly, competition in the product and capital markets and legislation also serves as 
another broad external corporate governance mechanisms (Williamson 1985; Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997). In this respect, Jensen (1986) also concurs that the control function of debt can be 
an effective agency cost reducing mechanism in dealing with the problems of free cash flow 
where  management acts to refrain from returning  excess cash to shareholders by investing in 
available projects albeit with sub-optimal returns. However, there is also evidence of significant 
loan providers extracting excess value from their borrower corporations (Weinstein and Yafeh 
1998).  
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A group of researchers puts forward the view that agency cost reducing mechanisms cannot be 
studied individually and in isolation to other mechanisms (Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Bhagat 
and Bolton (2008), and Hu and Izumida (2008). Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) examine the 
effects of the seven most commonly used agency cost reducing mechanisms when the 
technology of production, the markets in which the corporation operates, and the CEO‟s 
characteristics are controlled for. They find that corporations use a combination of these 
mechanisms to address agency problems. Because of the interdependence among these 
mechanisms, “cross-sectional Ordinary Least Squares regressions of firm financial performance 
on single mechanisms may be misleading” and hence a system of simultaneous equations is to be 
used to investigate these complex relationships. In subsequent research, Bhagat and Bolton 
(2008) and Hu and Izumida (2008) independently confirm in their separate studies the 
importance of taking into account the endogenous nature of the interrelationships among 
ownership, corporate governance control variables and corporate financial performance. 
3.2 Agency Problems and Financial Performance  
 
Berle and Means (1932) wrote one of the first papers to examine the relationship between 
corporate ownership and financial performance. They claim that the diffused ownership of U.S. 
corporations breaks the link between the ownership and the control of corporate resources. With 
a lesser number of shares, an individual shareholder‟s control is diluted while the manager‟s 
control becomes total. With control firmly vested in managers who have differing interests, the 
maximization of corporate value may no longer be the managers‟ primary goal to pursue and this 
conflicting interest gives rise to agency problems.  
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) divide agency costs into monitoring, bonding and residual costs. 
Monitoring costs are incurred on the part of shareholders to make sure that management is acting 
in the best interest of shareholders. Bonding costs are incurred on the part of shareholders and 
management to make sure that the interest of shareholders is being pursued. Lastly, residual costs 
are  dead-weight losses from the remaining divergence of interests between shareholders and 
management. Berle and Means (1932) and later Jensen and Meckling (1976) contend that agency 
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costs reduce corporate value. As long as agency costs are kept lower than the benefits accruing to 
these efficiencies, a lower market valuation of the corporation will not occur. 
  
Holderness (2003) finds in a survey of the literature that shareholders might also take to 
expropriate corporate resources, even when they have incentives to monitor. For instance, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and La Porta et al (1999) find empirically that expropriation of 
minority shareholders is prevalent in corporations controlled by large shareholders. Burkat, 
Gromb, and Panunzi (1997) in their study of the effect of large shareholders on the value of firms 
suggest that large shareholders‟ tight control reduces managerial effectiveness. Weinstein and 
Yafeh (1998) in their study of the effect of bank-corporation relationships on corporate financial 
performance in Japan find that bank-controlled keiretsus exceed their monitoring roles and 
charge their affiliated corporations higher interest rates.  
 
In summary, diverse ownership could present distinct contingencies giving rise to different 
extent of agency problems in terms of its associated costs and the resulting corporate 
performance. The degree of agency problems measured by their associated costs in diffused 
owned corporations are likely to be different to those of majority-controlled corporations. 
Therefore, we will examine how the agency problems affect the financial performance under 
different types of ownership in the Pakistan banking system. 
 
3.3 Theory of Ownership  
 
Ownership is the corporate governance mechanism that has been studied most extensively in the 
U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan. Like  ownership in the U.S. publicly listed corporations, those 
in the U.K. counterparts are also relatively diffused. Unlike the ownership in the U.S. and the 
U.K. publicly listed corporations, Kang and Shivdasani (1999), Morck and Nakamura (1999), 
and Lins and Servaes (1999) found that those in Germany and Japan are more concentrated with 
the banks as shareholders. 
 
Most research on corporate governance divides corporate ownership into two main categories of 
diffused ownership and majority-controlled (or shareholder) ownership. However, Bebchuk, 
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Kraakman and Triantis (1999) identify another ownership, as found in dual-class share 
structures, stock pyramids and cross-ownership ties, in which a shareholder who owns a small 
shareholder exercises significant control over the company. 
 
The  third ownership is termed „minority-controlled ownership‟. Minority controlled ownership 
exhibits characteristics of both majorities-controlled and diffused ownership. As in the case of 
majority-controlled ownership, the controlling party is protected from the market for corporate 
control. In the other case, the controlling party is an insider who resembles the entrenched 
management. In order to elucidate the role played by the controlling minority, the technique 
introduced by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) in tracing control to the ultimate 
ownership via control rights in lieu of cash flow rights is used to establish the ownership 
measure. 
Finance theory suggests that ownership whether it is concentrated or otherwise, is typically 
influenced by the characteristics of the company (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Larger companies 
tend to have highly diffused ownership than smaller ones. The high cost of share ownership and 
the ease of securing control in larger companies both help to promote diffused ownership. Driven 
by the individual shareholder‟s limited risk appetite, companies with higher risk profiles will also 
tend to be widely held.  
 
Similarly, companies that perform above average since incorporation tend to be the majority-
controlled by the original shareholders. Empirical studies also find that lower ownership 
concentration is determined by increased instability of the company‟s environment, company 
size, industry regulation, a single class share and an outsider CEO when controlled for the 
industry and company‟s age. Shleifer and Vishny (1996, 1997) further suggest that concentrated 
ownership is more common in countries where the judicial enforcement of property rights is 
weak. Recent research across various countries revealed differences in the degree of ownership 
concentration and the identities of the shareholders. 
 For instance, Xu and Wang (1997) note that highly concentrated shareholdings of government, 
institutions, and retail investors are common in China. Blass, Yafeh, and Yoshua (1998) noted 
that banks and affiliated institutional investors as the biggest non-insider shareholders in Israel 
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while  Faccio and Lang (2001) further document that most of the publicly listed companies in 
Western Europe, excluding the U.K. and Ireland, are family owned. 
3.4 Foreign Banks Ownership 
 
Foreign bank ownership in emerging economies like Pakistan has been rising rapidly since the 
1990s. This thesis examines its effects on host macroeconomic stability, the transmission of 
monetary policy through the bank lending channel, and its effects on the output in the host 
countries. Foreign bank ownership in Pakistan has been rising since the late 1980s, and 
experienced a drastic increase in late the 1990s in emerging and transition economies. Although 
having access to international bond markets, economic agents depend on the privately operating 
banks (either private or foreign owned) for their consumption and production. 
 
Households have to hold deposits to finance a part of their consumption, and firms have to use 
loans to finance their payment for production factors. Banks are costly in producing deposits and 
loans, and interest rates work as the mechanism to transfer internal and external monetary shocks 
into the real side of the economy. 
 
Foreign banks differ from private banks in that they are more efficient in producing deposits and 
loans, which may enable them to provide higher deposit rate and the lower loan rate. In the 
presence of foreign banks, the private banking market is usually observed to be more 
competitive. A possible danger of foreign bank ownership is the transmission of foreign shocks 
to private agents through the credit channel by foreign banks. With the economy where foreign 
banks dominate, this is suspected to bring more fluctuation than when the financial sector is not 
open. In addition, central bankers may worry about the effectiveness of monetary policy in the 
case of dominant foreign bank ownership. Monetary policy is one of the most important policies 
in the government‟s arsenal used to reduce the short-term fluctuation and stabilize the economy. 
No government wants to lose the effectiveness of monetary instruments (Ramizur, 2010). 
 
Finally,  Pakistani governments expanded the scope of foreign ownership in private banks after 
the 1997 Southeastern Asian financial crisis. Foreign bank ownership grew in the victim 
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countries of the crisis. However, reliance on foreign banks has been much less in Pakistan, and 
the restrictions more or less remain in the presence of foreign capital in local banks. 
 
Foreign banks may bring lots of benefits, one of the most important benefits is their ability to tap 
into external liquidity of their parent banks. This step reduces the risk associated with deposit is 
and improve banking performance in emerging market. However, this benefit may turn into a 
loss on the lending side. The parent bank provides liquidity insurance and also have a risk for its 
capital that is why provide the guarantee in the emerging markets (Ramizur, 2010). 
 
Private banks lack this benefit in terms of access to external liquidity. This becomes a serious 
concern particularly in emerging markets where the regulations and legislations are weak. For 
this reason private domestic banks face crises and failures (Bhagat, 2009). 
 
3.5 Foreign Banks Ownership in Different Countries  
 
Foreign bank ownership, as the mainstream of financial sector foreign direct investment in 
developing countries, started in the 1980s and surged in the late 1990s. Most of the foreign 
ownership has taken place via cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A), which rose up 
from 320 cases during the 1978-1989 period to more than 2000 during the 1990-2001 period 
(Claessens and Lee, 2002).  
3.6 Private Banks Ownership  
 
Private Banks own significant market share in all over the world. Whereas the private banks and 
foreign banks have mix size in term of assets and age distribution, particularly in Pakistan. 
However, government banks are much bigger and much older than private and foreign banks. 
This sets a new era for Pakistan financial markets to open new banks with large government 
banks to start a competitive base banking market for its customer  (Neuman, 2005). 
The private banks have different behavior towards their foreign counterparts. Private banks act 
more aggressively in their lending compare to foreign banks.  Private banks hold less liquid 
assets than foreign banks and have more assets in the form of loans.  Moreover, private banks 
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earn more interest than foreign banks. Surprisingly, the default rate of foreign and private banks 
has no major differences (Cooper, 2006). 
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3.7 Resource Dependent Theory 
 
Different external resources affect the performance of organizations and influence the decision 
making performance. “The basic concept of resource dependent theory was focused mainly on 
economic explanations including terms of trade, price volatility and resource dependency” 
(Carbonnier
 
 et al, 2011). The relationship of resource based view and the economy has been 
substantial (Lockett, A. & Thompson, S., 2001). The study of the impact of different external resources 
on the practices of the organization can be accessed by resource dependency theory. Companies 
are required different sort of resources to operationalise business activities like financial 
resources, technological resources and human resources. Without the utilization of these resource 
companies cannot progress in their respective field.  
In order to interact with each other companies utilize these resources for multiple purposes. 
Sometime the resource dependency has an adverse effect and stops various developments. 
According to  Will Martin (2002), the economic output should be restructured to avoid the 
adverse consequences of resource dependency within the organizational culture. The policy 
should involve the increasing accumulation of physical and human capital and the promotion of 
technological change in manufacturing and service sector. Different types of risks have 
associated with it hence companies‟ deals with multiple situations. Researchers indicate the 
resource dependent theory as the power for organizations.  
Resource Dependent Theory characterizes the links among organizations as a set of power 
relations based on exchange resources.  The concept of resource dependent theory in the inter 
organization relationship system is very simple, just get those resources from others in which 
you are lacking and give others those who have in excess. Evidences show that the banking 
sector mainly running on the basis of resource dependent theory. The lacking factor is essential 
for the establishment of relationships. Organizations develop and alter their existing structure, 
pattern and actions on the basis of dependencies on others, and this dependency was normally 
due to the resource dependency. Resource Dependent Theory and some assumptions: 
1- Companies have internal and external relationships which appear from social transactions 
that are established to influence and management conducts. 
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2- Valuable and rare resources make the grounds of relationship is essential for the survival 
of the organizations. 
3- Companies normally considered working for two objectives according to the resource 
dependent theory. Maximum the acquisition of resources which minimizes the 
dependency level and affecting the other organization's power by exchanging resources. 
4- Companies normally considered working for two objectives according to the resource 
dependent theory. Maximum the acquisition of resources which minimizes the 
dependency level and affecting the other organization's power by exchanging the 
resources. 
 3.8 Conceptual Framework 
 
In applying research a conceptual framework works as a map which provides the approach and 
possible course of actions to obtain the preferred results. It is usually constructed by affiliating 
and defining the relationships between the problem statement, purpose and concept of study. In 
this research study a conceptual framework can be constructed by defining the nature and scope 
of this study. It can be developed on the basis of theoretical issues and literature available. Lots 
of studies suggest that banking performance can be measured by studying the financial ratios. In 
this regard most of researchers recommend ROA.  
 
John P. et al. (2005) used ROA (Return on Asset) as a dependant variable in order to measure the 
bank's performance. Similarly Xiaochi Lin and Yi Zhang  (2009) utilized ROA and ROE to 
measure the bank performance to conduct the study on bank ownership reforms and its 
subsequent impact on bank performance in China. This shows that a conceptual framework for 
this typical study can be constructed on the basis of the foundation and development of concept 
of measuring the impact of banking ownership structure on banking performance.  
 
So, on the basis of available literature and the problem statement I have selected three key ratios 
covering the profitability and liquidity of a bank because the performance of a bank more 
concerned with its profitability and liquidity. ROA, ROE and Dividend Payout Ratios have been 
used in this study as the purpose of measuring the performance of a bank. Bank ownership is 
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being taken as an independent variable. Ownership is being classified in two types i.e. domestic 
and foreign. 
 
Figure 5: Conceptual framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary of Variables 
Variables Definitions 
Dependent Variable  
Financial performance  
ROA Net profit\Total assets 
ROE Net profit\Total Equity 
Dividend payout ratio Dividend\profit 
Independent Variable  
Ownership  
Domestic Bank “The banks incorporated in Pakistan and 
controlled by the private sector are termed 
Ownership 
Financial 
performance 
Domestic=0 
Foreign=1 
 
Control variables 
Size=total assets 
Time 
 
ROA 
ROE 
Dividend 
pay out 
ratio 
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As domestic private banks.” 
 
Foreign Bank “A bank, not incorporated in Pakistan, which 
has a branch or branches doing banking 
business in Pakistan under a license issued by 
the State Bank in this behalf.” 
 
Control variable  
Size Total asset of the bank 
Time No of the years 
 
 
3.9.1 Construction of variables 
 
Variable is the characteristics which we can measure or observe in our conceptual model. 
Variables are linked to values which can be measured or verified, thus the variables directly 
measure the single value. (Hair, 2007, p. 145). 
According to Zikmund (2010, p. 119) “A variable is anything that varies or changes from one 
instance to another”. The opposite of the variable is called, constant which is fixed value and 
does not change its value. Different types of variables are used by researchers.  
For this study we will use the following variable. 
3.9.2 Dependent variable 
 
A variable that depends on the other variable is called the dependent variable. The dependent 
variable is represented by letter “Y”, if the study involves more than one dependent variable than 
it will be represented as Y1, Y2 and so on. (Zikmund et al. 2010, p.120)  
For this study we have taken one variable that is financial performance. 
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3.9.2.1 Financial Performance 
 
For this study we have one dependent variable that is financial performance. We will measure 
the financial performance with the help of ROA, ROE and Dividend payout. 
 
John P. et al. (2005) use the ROA as the dependent variable to measure the performance where 
as Yi Zhang (2009) in his study use the ROA and ROE to investigate the performance. However,  
I cannot find any study in which dividend payout is used to measure the performance. Therefore, 
it would be interesting to see the effect of dividend payout in relation to the performance of the 
banks. 
3.9.3 Independent variable 
 
A variable that has an effect on the dependent variable or that affects the dependent variable by 
some way is known as independent variable.the independent variables are not influenced by the 
dependent variable due to the impression they are studying outside the process of being 
studied.the independent variable is represented by letter “X” (Zikmund et al. 2010, p.120). 
3.9.3.1 Ownership 
 
Randall Morck et al (1999) uses  “ownership” as independent variables to see the different 
structures of the ownership on the firm values. 
3.9.4 Control Variable 
 
The variable which can affect the independent variable and can affect the result of statistical 
experiments is known as a control variable. In empirical research, the control variables are used 
to purify the relationship between dependent and independent variable (Schindler, 2001). For this 
study, we will use two control variables  i.e. size (Total assets) and time. 
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Abid A. Burki et al (2006) used total assets and time of different reform periods as control 
variable. In this current study we will also control the total assets as size and time period to 
purify the relationship between dependent and independent variable. 
 
 
3.10 Construction of Hypothesis 
 
Construction of the hypothesis is a process of identifying the problem statement, identifying the 
possible causes and realizing the effects by reviewing the available literature on your proposed 
research study. The impact of ownership structure on bank performance in Pakistan is the 
problem statement in this study. In this study we have an ownership structure as a cause which 
have an impact on bank performance. A number of studies have been done on this typical study 
in different part of the world. Muhammet Mercan et al (2003) determines that the private and 
foreign banks performed better than state owned banks in turkey during 1989 to 1999. According 
to the Marcia Millon Cornett et al, (2010) domestic (private) banks in Asia have better 
performance rather than foreign banks. The above are the literature evidences which elaborate 
the basic concept of this study. 
3.11 Problem Statement and Main Research Question: 
 
The main research question of this study was the impact of ownership structure of the bank's 
performance operating in Pakistan. This helps us to identify the dependent and independent 
variable, the cause and effect. The hypothesis is basically a technique to show the cause and 
effect relationship.  Again we are bound to get evidences from literature and literature tells us 
that banking performance can be measured by analyzing the some financial key ratios. Financial 
ratios provide the insight picture of profitability and liquidity of a firm.  
 
By reviewing the past literature we conclude that in most of the studies bank performance has 
been measured on the basis of ROA and ROE along with other suitable financial ratios. I will 
evaluate bank performance in the shape of ROA, ROE and Dividend Payout Ratio. The bank 
which has better ROA and ROE would have better performance. Similarly, Dividend Payout 
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Ratio tells us the story of the firm‟s ability to pay out its shareholders from net income. A 
company which has high income will have a high dividend payout ratio. It is a useful financial 
performance indicator. So on the basis of available literature I have drafted following hypothesis; 
H1: Domestic banks have better ROA as compared to foreign banks. 
H2: Domestic banks have better ROE as compared to foreign banks. 
H3: Domestic banks pay more dividends as compared to foreign banks. 
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Chapter 4: Research Methodology 
 
4.1 Research Design, Approach and Sampling 
 
Research is a systematic way of investigation to solve problems and research methodology is a 
process of getting solved. The main purpose of this research study was not to compute the 
performance of domestic and foreign banks operating in Pakistan, but to find out that either 
domestic banks are better in performance or foreign banks. This examination leads in the 
direction of analysis of data of different domestic and foreign banks operating in Pakistan. There 
are different approaches in research to deal different types of research problems; qualitative, 
quantitative and mixed approach. This study has been conducted on the basis of the positivism 
paradigm as Healy & Perry (2000)  explain that positivism research approach dominates and 
widely used in scientific research studies because it measures the facts about a single 
apprehensible reality. Basically this research study has been conducted on the basis of pre-
developed phenomena that domestic banks have better performance than foreign. Quantitative 
research methods have been used to collect and analyze the data because quantitative research 
approach is being widely used to test theory deductively from existing knowledge, by developing 
hypothesized relationships and anticipated results. 
All the domestic and foreign banks operating in Pakistan where the anticipated population for 
this research study. To gauge the difference of the performance level of domestic and foreign 
banks stratified systematic sampling technique has been used. In stratified systematic sampling 
population can be alienated into identified groups, and each group sampled using a systematic 
approach. For this study we divided our population into two known groups on the basis of 
ownership i.e. foreign banks and domestic banks. 16 foreign banks and 27 domestic banks 
operating in Pakistan have been selected for this research study. Through quantitative data 
collection techniques, different types of secondary data have been collected from the annual 
financial statements of banks to analysis the research questions. There are two types of 
secondary data exists mainly on the basis of its use either internal or external.  
A different sort of financial data from banks from 2001 to 2010 has been collected to study the 
performance variation of banks. Our data set has a significant year-by-year financial data along 
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with the type of ownership. It consists of 198 observations, each representing the selected 
variables for a specific financial year . Due to unavailability and irrelevancy of primary data for 
this type of research we can rely on secondary data. Research based on primary data has different 
type of nature of the investigation. 
4.2 Tools and Procedures of Data Analysis 
 
To scrutinize the impact of bank ownership structure on bank performance in terms of ROE, 
ROA and Dividend Payout Ratio I used the panel data set comprises of the balance sheet 
information about different banks categories on the basis of ownership. Ownership variable has 
been divided into two main groups i.e. domestic and foreign. Overall performance has been 
classified into three measures for this research study:  the return on equity (ROE), return on 
assets (ROA) and dividend payout ratio (DPR).  ROE is a ratio calculated by dividing the income 
over equity and ROA measures the profit per dollar. These ratios have been widely used in bank 
performance studies. 
The panel data is such a data set in which units of observations diverges in two or more 
dimensions. Using panel data has several benefits along with certain limitations as well. 
According to BALTAGI (1995) using panel data in econometric research studies give more 
control for individual heterogeneity.  He further explains that panel data has more information, 
more variability, less co-linearity among the variables, more degrees of freedom and more 
efficiency.  
Panel data can be classified in balanced and unbalanced data sets. We have unbalanced panel 
data set for this typical course of study because some observations are missing. Panel data is a 
data set when we have two or more than same units of observation in a cross-sectional way. In 
this panel data set we have collected the same sort of data from different foreign and domestic 
banks from 2001-2010. Our panel data set have both cross sectional and time series dimensions. 
Analysis of panel data has become important in Econometrics along with panel data analysis 
techniques. As simple panel data form is; 
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Different regression models are being used for the analysis of panel data set. A general 
regression model equation is; 
                 
To analyze our panel data set we have used Hausman test. Hausman test, tests whether random 
effects estimation would be good. Evidences show that the Hausman test has been used in most 
of bank performance studies in which bank performance has been evaluated on the basis of bank 
ownership. For this research, fixed effects as well as random effects models are considered. All 
the data handling and analysis is being done in STATA 12. STATA is complete, incorporated 
statistical software which provides an effective platform for data handling and analysis for 
research purposes. A Wooldridge Test has been used to perform the autocorrelation analysis of 
our panel data.  
4.3 Managing Omitted Variable Bias 
 
When we use the multivariate models, there is a possibility that the coefficient derived from 
regression analysis  has some omitted variable bias (Boring, 2010). It happens when the models 
suffer from missing variable which has some impact on the depend variables and this may lead to 
affect the coefficients in the model which may create some biased and misleading results 
(Chamberlian, 1985). To prevent this,it requires to control the unobserved effects of these 
omitted variables. We can find several methods to  omitt the variables from the econometric 
literature. Two of them are fixed effects model and random effects model (Kim and Frees, 2006). 
4.4 Selection of Method 
 
To select which method is suitable for managing the omitted variables we have to go through the 
random effect model and fixed effect model. The fixed effect model assumes the constant term 
differences can use the differences across cases such as Banks as used in this study. By this we 
can control the unobserved individual case effects to be controlled by correlating with predictor 
variable. This helps to remove the effects of unobserved effects of the predictor variable and 
changes in a variable over time can be utilized. This model is also suitable when we want to 
control the omitted variable over the time (Wooldridge, 2006). 
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Random effect includes the unobserved heterogeneity while the fixed effect is observed by 
intercept. This advantage of the random effects leads its assumption of uncorrelated relationship 
between the predictor variable with the unobserved effects. However, many researchers think 
this assumption is unrealistic (Kim and  Frees, 2006). 
According to (Sven and Daniel, 2007) fixed effect model is superior to the random effect as it  
does not include such assumption . However, it needs to take some precautions because there are 
different cases where random effect models are more suitable to use, especially when the omitted 
variable affect the difference across case but remain constant over the time. 
In case if the assumptions hold, the random than the random effects estimator must be more 
efficient until it allows identification of intercept which is different in fixed effect. With this 
argument of fixed effect model and random effect model the researchers use the Hausman test to 
measure the each model assumption to determine which model is more appropriate for this study.  
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Chapter 5: Results and Analysis 
5.1 The Econometric Analysis 
This chapter belongs to the detailed results of panel data and econometric analysis. Different sort 
of analysis has been performed on given data and results have been calculated. The details are 
given below; 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics: 
 
Below table 2 shows, we have the summary of data defining the central tendency and dispersion 
of the data. The table exhibits the minimum and maximum value of each variable that actually 
tells about the date range of each variable. Mean and Std. Deviation of each variable also given 
below.  
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
 
5.3 Correlation Analysis 
 
Correlation analysis shows that whether the variables are correlated to each other or not. In 
STATA it is simple and can be generated with a single line command. The correlation analysis 
helps to determine the multicolinearity between variables. The table 3 below shows the 
correlation of the variables and it tells the correlation coefficient for ROA and ROE is 0.2665, 
the correlation coefficient between ROE and Ownership is -0.1265 and between ROA and 
Ownership is -0.1817 which shows the ROA and ROE both are negatively correlated with 
         roa         198    .0049142    .0322094  -.2232203   .1518921
total_assets         198    161015.2    205594.5    735.255    1035025
dividend_p~t         199    .0106281    .0447134          0   .4885198
         roe         198   -.0131572    1.109081  -14.74267    .595419
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
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Ownership. The Dividend Payout is positively correlated with Ownership and has a value of 
0.0302. 
 
Table 2 Correlation analysis 
 
 
Mutlicollinearity between the independent variables occurs when the variables are at high but 
with no perfect correlation within the multiple regression model. The findings of high 
multicollinearity are contradictory for the expectations of the independent variables to correlate 
between the dependent variable. This problem is due to sample but not with the model. This 
leads towards the decrease in the power of explanatory information of the independent variables 
to the dependent variable and may cause the wrong results that the independent variables are not 
related to the dependent variables. At what extent the correlation can cause the multicollinearity 
is not well described. However the scholars and Statistians have different view cut off in the 
correlation that harms the existence of multicollinearity. (Hair, 2010) 
Hair ( 2010) has a view that the cut off point is 0.9 correlation coefficient of which lower that 
there is no effect of multicollinearity.  Also Bagheri and midi  (2009) has the same view about 
the cut off point of 0.9 correlation coefficients. In this study we will use the Hair  (2010) 
approach to determine the multicollinearity.  Hence the correlation coefficient between the 
moderate effect of ROA and ROE is lower than the cut off point of 0.9. This correlation 
coefficient provides a clear dimension that there is no problem of multicollinearity. 
Multicollinearity can also be accessed by calculating variance of inflation factor (VIF) for each 
coefficient in the model. This statistic tool is used to observe the seriousness of multicollinearity 
problem. (Mansfield and Helms, 1982). However , there is no consensus for the cut off point to 
use VIF. In his study Hair ( 2010) has the view that VIF above 10.0 mean creates the problem for 
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multicollinearity. Hair (2010) also suggest how to solve the problem of multicollinearity in the 
dataset. He suggests that more data must try to obtain or just increase the sample size to correct 
the problem and also we can transform the variables to correct this problem in multicollinearity. 
For this study we have calculated the VIF to check the multicollinearity problem by using the 
STATA. 
Table 3 Variance of Inflation Factor 
 
 
                  
Table 4 shows VIF for ownership is 1.03 which is below the VIF value of 10 as according to 
Hair ( 2010) therefore, we can say there is no existence of the problem of multicolinearity in our 
model. 
5.4 Regression Analysis 
5.4.1 Linear Regression 
 
To speculate the relationship between the ROA, ROE and Dividend payout with ownership we 
have used the linear regression model. 
Outputs of results are given below; 
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Results show that the there is no significant ownership effect on ROA and ROE. But in our data 
model the ownership has a significant effect on Dividend Payout. This gives us the answer to our 
research question “Do the ownership has an impact on financial performance.” So we can say 
ownership has no significant relationship with ROA and ROE.  
5.4.2 Assumptions of Multiple Regression Analysis 
 
Now we will focus to investigate the variables in our regression equation to check the 
assumptions. These assumptions are necessary in order to predict the actual relationship among  
the variables  and also when the regression coefficients are estimated. These assumptions include 
the linearity of the relationship between the dependent and independent variables, constant 
variance of the error term, independence of the error terms and normality of the error term (Hair, 
2010). 
TO check the assumptions in model is vital because it exhibits the actual relationships between 
variables. We have used Breusch-Pagan test to test the Heteroscedasticity, which provide the 
facility to test the null hypothesis to observe Heteroscedasticity across the range of independent 
variables. Results show that ROA is not significant (P> .05) . But the ROE and dividend Payout 
are significant so we cannot reject the null hypothesis for ROA. 
 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of roa 
chi2(1) = 0.96 
Prob > chi2 = 0.3279 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of roe 
chi2(1) = 271.44 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
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Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of dividend_pay_out 
chi2(1) = 184.34 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
5.4.3 Normality 
 
In this study we will use the normal probability plot to test the normality of the error term. The 
variable ROA was not normally distributed.so we use log transformation to compute it. 
However, the results are near the normality which is acceptable in statistical perspective and by 
increasing the number of banks normality can be increased. The results are shown below:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.5 Auto Correlation 
 
Degree of similarity in time series data is essential to predict the perfect correlation between the 
variables. Fortunately we have a simple mathematical formula to calculate. Wooldridge test is a 
technique to calculate the autocorrelation in STATA.  It is as same as calculating the correlation 
between two different time series,  the only difference is that the same time series is used twice 
to test the data model for correlation. The second time series which is used to call the lagged 
Figure 6: Normality 
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version of the original time series. (Wooldridge, 2006). In STATA a simple user written program 
called xtserial is being used to calculate the autocorrelation.  
Below is the actual output of results to find out the existence of autocorrelation between 
independent and dependent variable. Results show that there is a relationship exists between the 
measures of dependent and independent variable. The test results for ROE and Dividend pay out 
are statistically significant (P< .05) while only ROA shows the opposite result. 
 
5.6 Fixed versus Random Effect 
 
To use the panel data model, we need to select the fixed effect model or random effect models in 
order to estimate the relationship of dependence among the variables in our model. the decision 
to go for the fixed effect model or random effect models can be made on the basis of Hausman 
test as it is suggested by the  literature keeping the issue of omitted variables (Wooldridge, 
2006). 
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The Hausman Test, tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the efficient 
random effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the consistent fixed effects 
estimator. If they are, then it is safe to use random effects (Wooldridge, 2006). 
For this purpose I have performed the Hausman Test to choose the appropriate model for our 
panel data. The results are given below; 
 
Table 4: Hausmann fe re 
 
 
Table 5: Hausmann fe1 re1 
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Table 6: Hausmann fe2 re2 
 
Above table 5,6 and 7 clearly states that we are unable to reject the null hypothesis as “difference 
in coefficients not systematic” to determine the ROA, ROE and dividend payout therefore, these 
results inform us to use the random effect method for analysis of this study. 
5.7 Ownership Structure Analysis 
 
As we have an independent variable measure to test the effect of ownership structure on bank 
performance so now we will calculate the Hausman Test for measures of ownership i.e. 
Domestic and Foreign. It will actually tell us that either foreign bank has better performance in 
Pakistan or the domestic banks operating here. It will substantially reflect the true picture of 
panel data. We have an ownership structure to show the impact on the bank‟s performance in 
Pakistan. To do this we have used Hausman Test and the results for each measure of dependent 
and independent variable are given below; 
 
For this purpose we used Hausman Test to test the null hypothesis and to choose the appropriate 
model. We perform the Hausman Test for each measure of the dependent variable with domestic 
ownership measure and take results.  
5.7.1 Impact of Domestic Ownership on Bank Performance 
Now we perform the “Hausman Test” for each measure of the dependent variable with domestic 
ownership measure independently and take results. The outputs of results are given below; 
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5.7.2.1 ROA and Domestic Ownership 
Table 7:ROA in domestic ownership in random effect model 
 
 
With the help of Hausman Test, we select between random effect model and fixed effect model. 
If the unobserved effect is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables then the RE estimator is 
more efficient than the FE estimator. The results do not deliver the enough information to reject 
the null hypothesis to determine the ROA. The results clearly suggest the random effect model to 
analyze the impact of domestic ownership on ROA of banks. 
Random Effect Model 
Table 8: Random effect model for ROA in Domestic ownership 
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The output of table 15 shows that the prediction equation for ROA = .0106461 (dorm) - 
.0021611 (years) + 4.07e-08 (total assets) + 4.327368. The positive value of coefficient of “dom” 
variable which specifies the domestic measure of ownership shows that domestic banks have 
better ROA when compared to foreign banks operating in Pakistan. 
5.7.2.2 ROE and Domestic Ownership 
Table 9:ROE in Domestic Ownership 
 
Table 16 above clearly shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis to determine the ROE. 
The results clearly suggest the random effect model to analyze the impact of domestic ownership 
on ROE of banks. 
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Random Effect Model 
 
Table 10: ROE in Random Effect Mod 
 
Table 17 results show that the prediction equation for ROE = 0.1356015 (dorm) - .0734409 
(years) + 8.62e-07 (total assets) + 147.0895. The positive value of coefficient of “dom” variable 
which specifies the domestic measure of ownership shows that domestic banks have better ROE 
when compared to foreign banks operating in Pakistan. However, it does not show the significant 
relationship with domestic banks. 
5.7.2.3 Dividend_pay_out and Domestic Ownership 
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Table 11: Dividend pay out in Domestic Ownership 
 
The above table 18 results clearly show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis to determine the 
Dividend Payout. The results clearly suggest the random effect model to analyze the impact of 
domestic ownership on Dividend Payout of banks. 
Random Effect Model 
Table 12: Dividend pay out in the random effect model 
 
The output of table 19 result shows that the prediction equation for dividend pay out = -. 
0029268 (dorm) - .00038946 (years) + 8.81e-10 (total assets) + 7.824159. The P value is less 
60 
 
60 
 
than 0.5 so the results reject the null hypothesis. This shows that domestic banks have a better 
dividend payout ratio when compared to foreign banks operating in Pakistan. 
The analysis of the results shows that the domestic banks operating in Pakistan have better 
performance than foreign banks. The performance of banks was being measured with the help of 
ROA, ROE and dividend Payout Ratio. 
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6.0 Discussion and Conclusion 
6.1 Discussion 
 
Financial performance is a well known topic when it comes with different types of ownership. 
Many Studies are available to show the results in different part of the world. As Berger et al 
(2007) discusses most of the debate and research about this topic has done in developed 
countries, particularly in the USA, the UK and some other parts of the European countries. I 
have also included the literature about this topic from Asia and other part of the world to find 
some interesting finding related to current issues in my study. However, it is interested to know 
not a single study cover all aspects of this study. This study is perhaps the first study in Pakistan 
which compare the performance of domestic and foreign banks of Pakistan during 2001 to 2010.  
This study also shows that domestic banks perform better as compared to foreign banks. In this 
study we focus on overall ownership and then test the results by analyzing the domestic banks. 
All regression models are significant which provide the proof of better performance compare to 
foreign banks, also the auto correlation approve our hypothesis. However, we further extend our 
analysis to observe the impact of domestic banks on their performance 
In our literature about the ownership and performance of banks, we have come across different 
results as Xiaochi Lin (2009) investigate the ownership impact on performance of domestic, 
public and foreign banks in China by using ROA and ROE and some other ratios and found that 
public banks perform poor as compared to domestic and foreign banks while the study in Ozkan 
Gurney et al (2006) investigate that domestic banks' performance decline. 
However, Jensen and Meckling  (1976) argue that ownership impact on the performance of firms 
is concerned with agency costs. These costs can be minimized depending upon how ownership is 
designed and organized to practice. Furthermore,  the theory of Ownership enterprise written by 
Hansmann (1996) also relates the agency theory in relation to ownership and argue that different 
costs occur with the fact who owns the organization. In other words we understand that costs 
related to ownership and agency costs refers to the situation who owns the organization. The 
control mechanism can not create the agency cost as the State Bank Of Pakistan has strict 
regulations on the bank's performance. 
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Although we can't derive any strong relevancy about the ownership and agency theory to 
determine any specific relation to ownership and performance. However, resource dependency 
theory clearly visible in this study. The domestic banks have more deposits than foreign banks 
which in reality helps the domestic banks to invest more to get more returns. 
 
As discussed in the literature,  Domestic (private) ownership in the Pakistan banking sector, most 
of the banks are owned by family groups so we can drive from the theory, owners have an 
incentive to have a direct relationship with the investors and depositers in order to mitigate 
agency and ownership costs. Therefore, the domestic banks have a significant relationship with 
the financial performance in our study and foreign banks lacks these results . Another, contrast to 
foreign bank ownership consists of different groups who do not have a direct relationship in the 
local market. 
 According to Demirug-count and Huizinga (2001) the foreign banks' entry in the local market, 
give a reason to the domestic banks to change their behavior in order to provide lower mark up 
rates on loans and pay more interest on deposits which in turn create tough competition for 
foreign banks to hold their position in the local market. However, the foreign banks consider the 
long term goal because  this way foreign banks can develop their market and can get more 
benefits in the shape of the most profitable banks.  
When we look at the  relationship of  ROA and ROE in domestic banks it provide us enough 
information to conclude our discussion with the previous studies. Our results support many 
studies examined in Pakistan which we have included in our literature. One reason could be the 
domestic banks have more market share as compared to foreign banks. Domestic banks have 
more branch network and other facilities to collect the deposits and to carry on the business in 
remote areas of Pakistan. Therefore, Domestic banks have more resources to invest the deposits 
in the form of loans and get the profit which in turn help the banks to earn more return on assets 
and equity. We cannot totally ignore the size of the banks although we have control the size of 
the banks in this study. But this is obvious big domestic banks don‟t depend on external 
resources to get more profitability where as the foreign banks are not so big in current time when 
it comes to the size of banks in Pakistan which gives us a point of understanding why ROA and 
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ROE is less than domestic banks. Moreover, ROE is not significant in domestic bank but shows 
the positive relationship. We are not sure but one reason we can define due to credit crunch 
which hit the world during  2006 and onwards, could be one reason for the domestic banks to 
face the equity problem. 
Where as foreign banks mostly operates in urban cities of Pakistan and don‟t have a vast branch 
network to collect the deposit from household customers as well as from business customers. 
This could be another reason to have lower ROA and ROE compare to domestic banks. 
Another interesting finding in our study is about the dividend payout. This dependent variable 
has a significant result in overall ownership which means both domestic and foreign banks pay 
dividends but domestic banks pay more as compared to foreign banks which support the results 
in turn as they have better ROA and ROE so automatically they are able to pay more from their 
profit to shareholders. The results becomes dramatic when we analyze the dividend pay out 
under the domestic ownership. The dividend payout is not significant but shows the positive 
relationship which means domestic banks tend to pay dividend. All the banks are listed on the 
stock exchange markets of Pakistan so by paying more dividends the domestic banks get more 
value from their shareholders. 
Although we can't derive any strong relevancy about the ownership and agency theory to 
determine any specific relation to ownership and performance. However, resource dependency 
theory clearly visible in this study. The domestic banks have more deposits than foreign banks 
which in reality helps the domestic banks to invest more to get more returns. 
As a whole we can argue due to the fact majority of the banks in Pakistan are domestic banks 
and established for decades and have their strong roots in the banking system of Pakistan and 
leave very narrow space for the foreign banks to get a higher return as compare to domestic 
banks. Although it would be interesting to investigate the results to control the Age factor of the 
banks with other control variables in order to show more reliable results. 
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6.2 Conclusion 
 
This study has examined the effects of ownership structure on the performance of banks 
operating in Pakistan. On the basis of previous literature we have chosen the performance 
indicators and that were Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE) and Dividend Payout 
which reflects the liquidity and profitability of the banks in aspects of performance. The 
ownership structure was divided on the basis of two important measures and that was domestic 
and foreign. Other control variables have also been studied to test the outer factor effects on the 
performance of banks. The control variables were total assets and time. To analyze the panel data 
of different domestic and foreign banks we have implemented various statistical analyses. The 
correlation analysis has been done to test the relationships between the measures of dependent 
and independent variables. The correlation analysis shows that the ROA and ROE are negatively 
correlated with the ownership structure but the dividend payout is positively correlated with the 
ownership structure. The results of linear regression show that there is no significant ownership 
effect on ROA and ROE. But in our data model the ownership has a significant effect on 
Dividend Payout. The assumptions of multiple regression analysis results indicate that the 
ownership has no significant effect on ROA but in our data set but ROE and Dividend Payout 
has significance. To find out the perfect relationships between the measures of dependent and 
independent variables we have performed an autocorrelation analysis which indicates that there 
is a significant relationship between all the measures of dependent and independent variables. 
The Hausman Test analysis for domestic and foreign banks reflects that the domestic banks 
operating in Pakistan are performing better than foreign banks. The main reason of this would be 
the deposit of domestic banks. As all the domestic banks have a major proportion of deposit in 
Pakistan. According to the economic survey of 2012 the five major banks of Pakistan have the 
above 50% proportion of deposits. This automatically enhances the probability of having the 
better ROA and ROE. The other factor would be having the higher total assets and equity than 
foreign banks. To be at the level of domestic banks it would be the long run for foreign banks 
operating in Pakistan. The analysis can be extended in new horizons as well. This initiates the 
several discussions and research dimensions. 
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6.3 Future scope of research 
 
Further area of research could use pool data and multiple regression model with more detailed 
data results to predict some strong policy for the banking industry in Pakistan. Another further 
recommendation of the research is to conduct an individual study on domestic and foreign banks 
to evaluate the ownership structure more in depth such as dividing the ownership in family 
groups of non family groups. This may provide the inside story to show the impact on financial 
performance of the banks. 
6.4 Limitation of this study 
 
This study has some limitations which can lead this study of less critical analysis. Due to the 
shortage of resources and time I was unable to collect more deep and sufficient data to analyze 
the subsequent impact of ownership on bank performance in the light of state owned policies and 
regulations which has an outer impact on banking sector of Pakistan. Due to insufficient data it 
would not be possible for me to generate highly reliable results but I can try to explore the 
relationship and the effects of different variables with respect to performance in the Pakistan 
banking sector. This research is limited to Pakistani Commercial banks, schedule with all the 
stock exchange of Pakistan and perform the commercial functions of the banks. It does not 
include the other kind of the banks as leasing banks, saving banks and house finance banks. 
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